As the recently launched autobiography of Nigeria’s former military President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, A Journey In Service, continues to elicit reactions from Nigerians, a former Provost Marshal in the Nigerian Army and retired Brigadier General, Don Idada-Ikponmwen, has confirmed that all was not well between Babangida, popularly called IBB, and late General Sani Abacha, who later became head of state after edging out Chief Ernest Shonekan, the head of the Interim National Government (ING) a contraption hurriedly put in place by IBB when he ‘stepped aside’.
Idada-Ikponmwen also corroborated Babangida’s claim in his book that Abacha was his “biggest headache” given what he personally witnessed.
In his A Journey In Service, Babangida had blamed Abacha for the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election he was to confess was won by Chief Moshood Abiola who died in mysterious circumstances under the regime of retired army General Abdusalami Abubakar.
The former military president had also justified the killing of his childhood friend and kinsman, Mamman Vatsa claiming that there was enough evidence implicating him in the coup and that his death was to ensure the country’s national stability.
Babangida wrote: “Without question, one of my biggest headaches at this time was Sani Abacha. I knew that Abacha was ambivalent about a return to civil rule. But I thought, in retrospect now – naively – that he would support our transition to civil rule programme.
“I obviously didn’t know everything about him! For instance, I was alarmed to discover that he and a handful of others mobilized negative opinions against me within the military, portraying me as the problem.
That campaign was geared towards a violent military coup to remove me as President forcefully”.
But weighing in on some of the contentious issues in the book, Idada-Ikponmwen, who was one of Abacha’s principal officers when he was Chief Of Army Staff, (COAS) told TELL in an exclusive interview that he was aware IBB and Abacha were “at daggers drawn” over the decision of the then president to redeploy him as COAS.
He recalled how Abacha, with the support of his principal officers, was the one who crushed the April 22, 1990, Gideon Orkar coup while Babangida went into hiding, only to appear when he was sure that his COAS and other officers were loyal to him.
As a prosecutor in the Vatsa coup case, he also suggested that the execution of the alleged coupists was a fait accompli given the circumstances surrounding the handling of their trial by the special military tribunal headed by General Charles Ndiomu.
Reflecting on the relationship between the duo which made Babangida describe him as his greatest headache, Idada-Ikponmwen said, “The only thing that surprised me in his book was that he said Abacha was his greatest problem. Yes; I am also not surprised that he said that because when I was Provost Marshal, I happened to have been a witness to the fact that Babangida and Abacha were at daggers drawn; they were at daggers drawn and Abacha succeeded in getting the support and favour of the majority of the traditional rulers; I won’t say all of them, and it was through the intervention of these traditional rulers that Babangida, at the time of their greatest strife – that is between him and Abacha – that Babangida started to concede certain things to Abacha because Abacha said he was not going to leave the office of the chief of army staff.
“You didn’t know about all that. In any way, you couldn’t have known. There was a time that Abacha refused to leave the office of the Chief Of Army Staff. He said he would not leave that office; that unless they made him chief of army staff and the chairman Joint Chief of Staff, that is, he wanted to be the chief of defence. He wanted to be in charge of both the army and defence. But that was a big battle.
“I think eventually, they appointed Saliu Ibrahim as chief of army staff. But I remember very well that Abacha said he was not going to leave the office of the chief of army staff, and he will not leave the Flag House. So, they had to find another house for Saliu Ibrahim and another office. I think they gave him Lagos House, that house along Marina that used to be the governor of Lagos’ house to Saliu Ibrahim and then created another office downstairs in the public house, but it was not the chief of army staff’s office that Saliu was using. Abacha maintained that office.
“I can’t remember everything, but quite frankly, there’s no how that Babangida would not have complained about Abacha’s total allegiance or loyalty judging from what happened that time. Babangida wanted to remove him as Chief Of Army Staff, and he refused to go… But the whole thing is a little disturbing”.
The former Provost Marshal now a practicing lawyer, however noted that the only unfortunate thing is that Abacha is not around to express his own view.
“But quite frankly, there were great times between them. The coup that we put down, the Orkar coup, it was virtually Abacha that put it down with his principal officers like us. I was in the Flag House from where the coup was brought down before IBB came out from hiding. Actually, I expected him to at least acknowledge that there was a time when they were the best of friends”.
In his role as an appointed prosecutor in the Vatsa coup trial, Idada-Ikponmwen suspected that some persons were not interested in justice for the accused persons.
Narrating his involvement, he said, “I was a military lawyer at that time and I had been posted to Zaria at that time as Commandant. The then provost marshal called me to come to Lagos and join the court marshal that was trying the coup plotters, and I was given the assignment of the prosecutor.
“The first day, we formally gathered to see how we would go on with the trial. Those who were responsible for the court martial, the security of the venue, they were observing us. I raised some observations on the trial and the observations I raised were two. One was that the court martial judge advocate (Major A. Kejawa) was too far from the president of the court who was (Charles) Ndiomu. I think he was a Major-General then. I made that point that a court martial president must sit near the judge advocate who is the lawyer of the court, the only lawyer of the court officially. …So, I said they should bring them together rather than separating them no matter how far they are in rank. The president nodded approval.
“The second point was that I told them that they were reading the summary of evidence, what we call proof of evidence. That is, the record, how the whole thing transpired in a nutshell. They were reading it to the court members. So, as a lawyer, I said no, we don’t do this. The judges in the panel, those who are members of the panel would hear evidence through the one led by the prosecutors, right. They would say their own, led in evidence by the prosecutor and they will also hear the evidence of the defence through those who are defending them, or they are defending themselves. They hear evidence and make up their mind on the basis of what they hear not the story they are told or paper they are given to read before the trial court.
“That again was not particularly easy for them to swallow but the president told us ‘Accepted’. I was the prosecutor. So, normally, nobody objects to a prosecutor in trial, especially in court marshal. So, we were told to go. After the day had gone far and we had been arguing and arguing who should be where and what should be told, the paper they distributed to the members, they collected them back. Are you getting me?
“So, at the end of the day, the trial did not start. We were told to come the next day to start the trial and I, as prosecutor, I went the next day early. At quarter to eight, I was there. Although I met the president there and a few others; I think the official time was either 8.30 or 9 am or so. So, when I was good to come out at 8.15, the president of the court martial was seated and some of the members, and the man saw me and said, come, come, prosecutor. I went straight to his seat, I saluted, and the next thing he told me was that I’m told you people should go back. You people, you should go back. I said ah ha, we should go back? I said sir, why? He said I don’t know, but they say you people should go back.
“He said, you and your team. I said, me and my team? And who were my team members? My course mates in NDA, now General Muktar. We were all then lieutenant colonel. The other one was the now retired General (Felix) Mujakperuo, now the Orodje of Okpe. I told the president, but my two colleagues, they are both in Lagos. You said the reason for sending us back is that you have no money to put us in a hotel. My colleagues are in Lagos, they didn’t come from outside. The man was surprised and he now said is that so? Anyway, they say all of you should go back.
“I felt something was wrong then anyways. I felt something was wrong then because I didn’t see what I had said that would warrant me to be sent back. And the rumours that went round then were that the three of us were too strong – as regular combatant officers and lawyers – combining these two professions together. I said why would anybody be too strong. The stronger the lawyer, the better for justice. Anyway, this was not civil court; this was military court, and we were all functioning as military officers and military lawyers so, we could not really question why they would send back people they thought were strong combatants cum lawyers.
“It would appear that somebody was not interested in having strong people who could speak the truth. But that we cannot blame IBB. We cannot blame it on IBB, and they may have made IBB to even take that decision, if it was him that took the decision”.
Idada-Ikponmwen found it strange that IBB, in his memoir, passed the buck of the June 12 annulment to Abacha.
According to him, “The other thing we cannot run away from is, in the military, there is a command structure, and the Commander takes responsibility for whatever happens in the end. It is not too palatable; it is not too plausible for the head to say it was somebody subordinate to him that took a decision. That is a little incredible”.
He said while the book may have cleared Babangida’s conscience, “but certainly, not many people will think that the book launch has cleared IBB from the blame Nigerians are holding him in respect of who was responsible for the annulment of June 12.
“For Vatsa, it wasn’t Babangida that set up the court marshal. It was done under the command of the army. So, the blame goes more to the man who set up the court marshal. Who was chief of army staff at that time? I can’t remember who it was at that time. (The chief of army staff at the time was Salihu Ibrahim but General Domkat Bali as Minister of Defence and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff convened the Special Military Tribunal that tried the coupists) That is a command responsibility.
“But for the issue of the election, it is very difficult for anybody to accept that the responsibility for the annulment was anybody else’s; very difficult. But I think it was good that IBB did the launching. He wanted to free his conscience, free his mind, that he has opened up to Nigerians”.
Why Babangida Said in His Book That Abacha Was His ‘Biggest Headache’ – Idada-Ikponmwen
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